Montclair State University

Montclair State University Digital
Commons
Department of Justice Studies Faculty
Scholarship and Creative Works

Department of Justice Studies

Spring 3-22-2020

George W. Bush, Policy Selling and Agenda-Setting after 9/11
Gabriel Rubin
Montclair State University, rubing@montclair.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.montclair.edu/justice-studies-facpubs
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Defense and Security Studies Commons, International and
Area Studies Commons, Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons, Legal Ethics and Professional
Responsibility Commons, Legal Profession Commons, Other Political Science Commons, Other Public
Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration Commons, President/Executive Department Commons,
Public Administration Commons, Public Affairs Commons, Social Justice Commons, and the Terrorism
Studies Commons

MSU Digital Commons Citation
Rubin, Gabriel, "George W. Bush, Policy Selling and Agenda-Setting after 9/11" (2020). Department of
Justice Studies Faculty Scholarship and Creative Works. 142.
https://digitalcommons.montclair.edu/justice-studies-facpubs/142

This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Justice Studies at Montclair
State University Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Department of Justice Studies Faculty
Scholarship and Creative Works by an authorized administrator of Montclair State University Digital Commons. For
more information, please contact digitalcommons@montclair.edu.

Chapter Two
George W. Bush, Policy Selling and Agenda-Setting after 9/11
This chapter explores how the George W. Bush Administration set the political
agenda and sold counter-terror policies after 9/11. George W. Bush set the agenda for a
global terrorism war and sold policies accordingly. His rhetoric pushed a threat that
was evil, resilient, and existential. The goal here is not to reiterate every policy and
occurrence that happened in Bush’s Global War on Terror, but rather to focus on the
themes of Bush’s post-9/11 rhetoric and set the stage for a robust comparison with the
rhetoric and policies of Barack Obama and Donald Trump in subsequent chapters.
Bush’s statements, of course, need historical context so we will begin with a short
history of how other recent presidents have spoken about the terror threat. Afterward,
the chapter will delve into a discussion of Bush’s rhetoric bolstered by findings from the
database on presidential speeches about terrorism. Note that frequency charts refer to
the number of speeches wherein Bush 43 elicited a certain theme or used a certain term
rather than the number of total times a theme or term was mentioned by Bush in his
speeches. In other words, if the President used the term “insurgent” five times in a
speech, it would still count as one speech wherein the term “insurgent” was used. The
same applies for the charts on thematic content and linkages. The notion here is to look
for trends among a broad set of speeches and not to let repetition within one speech
skew the results.
A Brief History of Presidential Terrorism Rhetoric
Carol Winkler writes that “Terrorism is perhaps the most emotive, pejorative
term in the English language.” The problem is that “The nation’s leadership has used it
to justify policies and actions that the American public would abhor in virtually any
other context”1. To Winkler, terrorism “demarcates the unacceptable” 2. Winkler argues
that casualty figures are not the reason behind the obsession with terrorism. Rather,
“Terrorism functions as a signifier of American identity, defining what the nation
stands for and against. The term divides those who are civilized from those who are
uncivilized, those who defend economic freedom from those who would attack
America’s way of life, and those who support democracy from those who would
disrupt it” 3.
During the Vietnam War, the Communists were portrayed as terrorists 4. Later, a
wave of mostly nationalist terrorism, frequently directed at Americans and taking place
more regularly in the Middle East, became a focus of President Ronald Reagan in the
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1980s 5. President Reagan, in 1985, stated that terrorism was being used “as an
instrument of state policy,” connecting terrorist acts to state actors6. Still, the Cold War
and the nationalist nature of terrorism made the question of to whom to affix the
terrorist label a convoluted one. For instance, did American support of El Salvador
equate to state sponsorship of terror?7 And what of its support of the Saudis? 8 In
combatting terrorists, Reagan employed Cold War discourse and described the
terrorists as “cowardly” and “uncivilized” 9. Framing the fight against terrorists within
the Cold War narrative took terrorists out of the sphere of criminal matters and into a
new framework of war 10. This ambiguity over the term “terrorism” by the American
government has, of course, carried over into the present.
In a May 1985 speech, Reagan reformulated the fight against terrorism. No
longer would he say that the Soviet Union was behind all international terrorism.
Instead, he named five states who were state sponsors of terrorism: Iran, Cuba, Libya,
North Korea and Nicaragua (Syria and South Yemen, identified for these purposes by
the State Department, were curiously not on the list) 11. Mirroring George W. Bush’s
future “Axis of Evil” formulation, Reagan fabricated connections between these state
sponsors implying that the group of states amounted to a criminal syndicate 12. Also like
Bush 43, Reagan framed the battle over terrorism as one over the future of democracy
and civilization 13. In addition, the Reagan administration justified preemptive use of
military force to fight state-sponsored terrorism 14.
Winkler finds that both Reagan and Bush 43 pushed for preemptive war in
response to terrorism through a series of rhetorical sleights. Both leveled ad hominem
attacks on their respectively alleged state sponsors of terror (Saddam Hussein in Bush’s
case, Libya’s Muammar Qaddafi in Reagan’s) 15, both highlighted the brutality these
leaders delivered upon their own people, and both extrapolated to “publicly accuse
their enemies of planning to extend their terrorist acts to America”16. Winkler holds that
this treatment came despite neither Qaddafi nor Hussein directly attacking Americans.
In this way, the presidents also framed Saddam Hussein and Muammar Qaddafi as
terrorists with global ambitions 17. Both Reagan and Bush 43 rhetorically equated
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Qaddafi and Hussein’s threatening words with actions—at least potential ones 18.
Interestingly, Winkler finds that the oft-mentioned gassing of the Kurds may have been
carried out by Iran 19. Her statements regarding the purported innocence of Qaddafi and
Hussein, however, stretches the truth or may rely on technicality given that Saddam
Hussein fought the Gulf War against Americans and Muammar Qaddafi was behind a
slew of international terrorist incidents.
While terrorism was less prominently discussed during the Clinton era,
President Bill Clinton did face a number of domestic and international incidents
including the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing and
the 1998 attacks on US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania 20. Clinton believed that he was
facing a new “modern terrorist threat” that included cyber-attacks and terrorists
looking to use weapons of mass destruction 21. Clinton portrayed these new terrorists as
an internationally connected syndicate that could and would attack anywhere—
including America 22. Deviating from Reagan, the Clinton administration enshrined
terrorists as “nonstate, criminal actors” 23. Significantly, President Clinton in 1996 stated
that Osama bin-Laden was “the preeminent organizer and financier of international
terrorism in the world today” 24.
Drawing a line between Islamic fundamentalists and moderates that would be
touted extensively by John Esposito and others post-9/11 25, Clinton stated in 1994 that,
“what the United States wants to do is to stand up against terrorism and against
destructive fundamentalism, and to stand with the people of Islam who wish to be full
members of the world community, according to the rules that all civilized people
should follow” 26. Clinton’s rhetoric, then, looked a lot like Obama’s in that Clinton
sought to tone down the threat after an era of playing it up 27.
George W. Bush’s Rhetoric Post-9/11: Emotion and Conflict
George W. Bush’s response to 9/11 was emotional and marked specifically by
anger 28. After a senseless attack that killed nearly 3,000 people, the American public
18
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was shocked and looked to the President for leadership. As Jeffrey Simon writes,
“Terrorism is a complex and frightening experience for the general public and it
becomes natural to look toward Washington for guidance and reassurance” 29. Bush
captured the anger of the moment when he famously stated on September 20, 2001,
“Every nation in every region now has a decision to make: either you are with us or you
are with the terrorists” 30. On September 11, President George W. Bush declared the
inception of a “war against terrorism” 31. Bush went on to widen the scope of the War on
Terror in his January 2002 State of the Union address where he labelled Iran, Iraq and
North Korea as an “Axis of Evil”—once again, the similarities with Reagan’s five statesponsors of terror should be emphasized. The Bush Administration’s 2002 National
Security Strategy would go on to justify preemptive strikes by stating “the greater the
threat, the greater is the risk of inaction” 32. To his credit, Bush, like Clinton before him, was
careful to separate terrorists and Islamic extremists from those who adhere to “the
peaceful teachings of Islam” 33.
After September 11, 2001, the Bush Administration adopted a strategy that
would seek to eradicate al Qaeda while also preventing terrorists and their supporters
from acquiring weapons of mass destruction 34. Bush saw terrorism post-9/11 as a new
and different threat—an assessment Clinton held about the terror threat of the 1990s 35.
Even the threat of non-state actors was not something new—Clinton and even Reagan
had dealt with the same 36—and one can go back to the anarchist wave of terror in the
late 19th and early 20th century to see the great effect of non-state actors on world
politics well before the dawn of the 21st century. While the characteristics of the
terrorists were not new, the magnitude of the attack was certainly unprecedented37.
Thankfully, no terror attack before or since even registers within the same order of
magnitude in terms of property damage and casualties.
It was in the immediate aftermath of the attacks that Bush began to establish the
themes that would be repeated throughout his presidency regarding terrorism. The war
would be a fight between good and evil and one that would not end until “every
terrorist group of global reach [had] been found, stopped, and defeated”38. Bush played
on public fear and hope in how he framed the conflict with terrorists and used this
rhetoric to successfully (and easily) win approval for the conflict in Afghanistan 39. A
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more fine-grained analysis of the themes Bush employed in his terrorism rhetoric will
be examined later in this chapter. The use of these themes by Presidents Obama and
Trump will be compared to their use by President Bush in subsequent chapters.
Far from being novel, Bush’s narrative about terrorism was borrowed. This time
from the Cold War40. The war on terrorism would represent an ideological battle
between civilization and “evil.” As will be seen in the data analysis, “evil” was a
recurring theme of Bush’s, particularly in the immediate aftermath of the attacks. The
President sought broader powers and connected al Qaeda to the Cold War by
emphasizing that al Qaeda’s global spread implied a goal for world domination 41.
Obviously, however, al Qaeda was far less powerful and capable than the Soviet Union
had been. The comparison was spurious at best.
One of the Bush Administration’s main linguistic responses to 9/11 was to
embed it in the framework of a “real war” fought “on many fronts” 42. To this end, the
war on terror was framed as expansively as possible (a war against an evil ideology)
rather than as narrowly as possible (a war against a militant group based in South
Asia). For instance, on May 1, 2003, Bush declared that, “From Pakistan to the
Philippines to the Horn of Africa, we are hunting down Al Qaeda killers” 43. Aligning
with the “many fronts” mentality, Bush portrayed the Iraq War as one “battle” in a
larger war 44. Bush’s expansive definition of terrorism and the conflict it engendered was
shared by America’s adversaries. This was an unfortunate outcome because Bush’s
portrayal of the conflict reinforced the claims made by al Qaeda. Osama bin Laden, after
all, portrayed the conflict with the United States as one of the Muslim world against
Westerner conquerors45. The outcome was that both sides adopted a clash of
civilizations mythology and applied it to the conflict 46. While Bush and his people,
borrowing again from Clinton, labeled bin Laden and his group as “false prophets”
who had twisted Islam 47, Bush’s own narrative proved to be fatalistic and Manichaean.
It is important to note here that George W. Bush made a whopping 85 terrorismfocused formal speeches after 9/11 in 2001 alone and 169 such speeches in 2002 (see
Chart 1.1). Jeffrey Tulis observes that like his father, George W. Bush was a reluctant
and not particularly gifted speaker 48. However, the 9/11 attacks forced Bush to make
multiple major speeches. Unfortunately, he used his bully pulpit to try to convince
Americans of a crisis that didn’t exist—the threat of the Iraqi regime 49. The Bush
Administration successfully linked Saddam Hussein to Osama bin-Laden—two figures
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who were decidedly not working together. One was a secular anti-Islamist Muslim, the
other a religious radical. Regardless, the administration connected Iraq with
Afghanistan using the “many fronts” logic (both wars symbolized the fight against
terrorism) 50. Further, Bush and his people played up the tenuous links between Iraq’s
government and international terrorism 51. One way they did this was by extrapolating
into hypotheticals as the President did on October 7, 2002 when he stated that, “All that
might be required [for a WMD terrorist attack] are a small container and one terrorist or
Iraqi intelligence operative to deliver it” 52.
Further, Adam Hodges, through careful textual analysis, notes the litany of ways
that President George W. Bush connected terrorism to war. Even going so far as to state
that terrorists are “successors to fascists, to Nazis, to Communists, and other
totalitarians of the 20th century” on September 20, 2001 53. On October 6, 2005, Bush
repeatedly reiterated the ideological aspect of the fight with terrorists, linking their
ideologies time and again to “the ideology of Communism” 54. This link, of course,
connects the war on terror to the Cold War.
As Table 2.1 shows, George W. Bush made a concerted effort to link terrorists to
weapons of mass destruction. President Bush made 61 speeches where he sought to link
terrorism to WMD in 2002 alone. In later years, while his frequency of speeches linking
terrorists to WMD waned, the percentage of speeches in which he did so shot up. Bush
pushed the terrorism-WMD connection hard in 2006 and 2007 as he sought to reemphasize the threat of terrorism to an increasingly weary American public. Terrorism,
to Bush, was an existential threat. He linked terrorists to existential threats to America
in 47 speeches in 2001 and 2002, in 45 speeches in 2005 and 2006, and in 33 speeches in
2007 and 2008/9.
[Insert Table 2.1 Here]
If terrorism was an existential threat where “evil-doers” could ignite weapons of
mass destruction against Americans, then anything and everything needed to be done
to prevent it. George W. Bush’s invasion of Iraq, expansion of executive power and
global war on terror filled this need. Wars abroad were complemented by civil liberty
reductions and increased surveillance at home. The Department of Homeland Security
was formed out of disparate departments and handsomely funded. The USA Patriot Act
gave law enforcement new tools to surveil Americans. And, as will be discussed in
greater detail in Chapter 3, CIA black sites and Guantanamo Bay opened the door to
“extralegal,” indefinite detention and “enhanced interrogation techniques.”
The Iraq-Al Qaeda link allowed the Bush Administration to portray the threat of
nuclear terrorism as a likelihood. The ingredients were there. All that was needed was
50
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for the established terror state and terror cell connections to be activated 55. Bush again
toyed with these possibilities stating on October 2, 2002 that, “Even a dictator is not
suicidal, but he can make use of men who are” 56. While Saddam Hussein was careful
not to make statements threatening U.S. targets, George W. Bush still publicly framed
the Iraqi government as linked to al Qaeda creating “a merged, homogenous collective
of terrorists and state sponsors” wherein the words of Osama bin Laden were grafted
onto the Iraqi threat. As Winkler summarizes, the Bush Administration purported that
“the expressed intentions of bin Laden and other members of al Qaeda” represented a
“valid justification for the use of force against Saddam Hussein” 57. It is well known by
now that the 9/11 Commission found no evidence of any link between Saddam Hussein
and al Qaeda 58. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace found the same
stating that, “There was and is no solid evidence of a cooperative relationship between
Saddam’s government and Al-Qaeda…There was no evidence to support the claim that
Iraq would have transferred WMD to Al-Qaeda and much evidence to counter
it…Administration officials systematically misrepresented the threat from Iraq’s WMD
and ballistic missile programs beyond intelligence failures” 59.
Testament to the power of presidential war rhetoric, by August 2003 polling
showed that 7 in 10 Americans believed that Saddam Hussein played a role in the 9/11
attacks60. Through the wanton use of “fabrication, exaggeration,…and questionable
sources” the Bush Administration was able to concoct a threat in Iraq that moved the
nation toward war and tricked the public 61. The power of presidential rhetoric on
terrorism and war could not be more evident.
Adam Hodges notes the media’s role in projecting these threats by repeating the
President’s words as soundbites62. The immediate aftermath of 9/11, when the public
was decidedly behind the President, “emphasized the power of the president to
construct fear, as transmitted through a compliant media system, and to amplify
preexisting fear in the American mind” 63. The media also rephrased key “speech
frames” introduced by the President. For instance, on October 8, 2004 the New York
Times noted that “Iraq is the central front in the war on terror” and on September 24,
2006, CBSNews.com stated that “fighting the terrorists in Iraq keeps them from
attacking America” 64. These statements became part of the national consciousness and,
to that end, could be viewed by some in the public as common sense. Hodges points out
that a counter-narrative did exist. For instance, on February 24, 2004, The Wall Street
55
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Journal referred to “the Bush Administration’s so-called war on terror” 65. Unfortunately,
this counter-narrative did not stop the march to war.
Bush, Terrorism and Evil
The Bush Administration used its words and policies to “view terrorism through
the prism of war,” to employ “the rhetoric of evil” and to engage in “the rhetoric of the
scapegoat as an exercise in blaming rather than problem solving” 66. This “public
exercise in extreme Othering,” Robert Ivie argues, undermined American democracy67.
Terrorism is not a new problem, but the way the George W. Bush Administration dealt
with it, employing a series of dichotomies such as “good vs. evil” and “us vs. them,”
made the problem worse. It eliminated areas of gray. It ignored domestic terrorists. It
divided the world 68. In the years after 9/11, George W. Bush would categorize the
terrorist enemy as “evil,” “without mercy,” “savage,” “totalitarian,” and as enemies of
the civilized world 69.
In the following chart, the number of times George W. Bush called terrorists
“evil,” “murderers”-or-“killers” (grouped together as “killers”) or “enemies” in his
speeches on terrorism after 9/11 is depicted. Note that while Bush used the term evil
heavily in 2001 and 2002, by 2003 he nearly completely stopped using it. This is
consistent with the trend for policy selling/agenda-setting that we will see in further
charts. A period of hammering home a point is followed by a period of quiescence on
that point. The reason is that the policy has been sold or the agenda set and the
President then moves on to other issues. One may counter that Bush’s dismissal of the
term “evil” could be chalked up to other factors such as the ineffectiveness of using the
term. That alternative hypothesis does not align with evidence as Bush’s use of the term
“evil” coincided with the successful passage of legislation and policies that he desired
including the USA Patriot Act, the war in Afghanistan and the Iraq War.
[Insert Chart 2.1 Here]
Terrorism can be seen as “performance violence” and the Bush Administration
performed its own symbolic violence in return70. This created a conflict wherein the
“reciprocal satanization of enemies by both sides mark everyone as legitimate targets of
escalating violence” 71. The Bush Administration established an Orwellian world of
paradoxes. As Ivie writes:
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“In using law as a weapon to defeat terrorism, civil rights would be sacrificed. In
fighting repressive regimes, freedom of speech would be curtailed. To uncover
hidden terrorist cells, citizens were to spy on one another. To increase airport
security, agents would resort to racial profiling…To bring terrorists to justice,
citizens’ privacy rights would be breached and legal representation denied. To
kill terrorists, civilians would be reduced to ‘collateral damage.’ To act patriotic
was to silence political dissent” 72.
By employing the theme of evil, the Bush Administration made a preemptive war
against Iraq possible 73. Such a conflict leaned on an impassioned public, the dismissal of
rational investigation and a muddying of the boundaries between Osama bin-Laden’s
group and Saddam Hussein 74. “Terror trumps democracy in the prevailing hierarchy of
political aims and measures when demagogues play the rhetorical card of evil,” Ivie
concludes75.
Colleen Kelley argues that George W. Bush’s rhetoric after 9/11 amounted to a
form of proto-fascism. She writes that “[t]he modern presidency has been described as
rhetorical in that the president acts through the media as a public opinion leader and is
the most significant spokesperson for an administration’s ideologies” 76. Kelley notes
that “fascism shares with all totalitarian movements the aim of ‘organizing masses, not
classes’” 77. Kelley shows that Bush’s language after 9/11 hit on many of fascism’s
“identifying characteristics” 78. These include “powerful and continuing nationalism,”
“disdain for the recognition of human rights,” unifying against enemies or scapegoats,
“avid militarism,” “obsession with national security,” tying together the ruling elite
with religion, and “a controlled mass media” 79. While the Bush Administration varied
in how they fulfilled these fascist categories, the rhetoric and response to 9/11 certainly
can be seen as proto-fascist when viewed against this rubric. Bush’s speech was
militaristic, nationalistic and obsessed with security—though perhaps rightfully so.
Kelley, through careful analysis of statements made by President George W.
Bush and his administration officials, shows that the post-9/11 discourse was framed as
one of good versus evil 80 and one where administration propaganda intertwined
religious faith with patriotism 81. As Kelley propounds, “Religion [was] the base of
George W. Bush’s theocratic, and so paradoxical, enactment of American democracy. It

72

Ivie, Democracy and America’s War on Terror, pg. 154.
Ivie, Democracy and America’s War on Terror, pg. 163.
74
Ivie, Democracy and America’s War on Terror, pg. 167.
75
Ivie, Democracy and America’s War on Terror, pg. 159.
76
Kelley, Colleen Elizabeth. Post-9/11 American Presidential Rhetoric: A Study of Protofascist Discourse.
(Lanham, MD: Lexington Books 2007), pg. 56.
77
Kelley, Post-9/11 American Presidential Rhetoric, pg. 7.
78
Characteristics of fascism were identified by Lawrence Britt in “Fascism Anyone?”, Free Inquiry 23:2 (Spring
2003).
79
Kelley, Post-9/11 American Presidential Rhetoric, pgs. 80-81.
80
Kelley, Post-9/11 American Presidential Rhetoric, pg. 160.
81
Kelley, Post-9/11 American Presidential Rhetoric, chapter 6.
73

is also the foundation of the protofascist rhetoric with which he has constructed [his]
vision of a presidency” 82.
While Kelley’s analysis may seem egregious, fascism is surely not a term of
endearment to anyone nor one to be taken lightly, she notes that, “In November 2006,
polls by the Ottawa-based EKOS Research group revealed that majorities of people in
Canada, Britain, Mexico, and Israel thought only Osama bin Laden and North Korean
leader Kim Jong Il made the world less safe than George W. Bush” 83. Hartnett and
Mercieca agree with Kelley’s condemnation of Bush’s post-9/11 rhetoric. They hold that
in an age of mass media “white noise” wherein the mass media serves to confuse and
drown out the public voice, we have entered a post-rhetorical presidency. Instead of the
President looking to mobilize and empower the people, under George W. Bush the
President sought to confuse in order to pursue the policies he favored. Hartnett and
Mercieca also note the religious nature of Bush’s speeches, which tie him to proto-fascist
discourse 84.
Policy Selling: From 9/11 to War with Iraq to “Human Rights”
As Robert Ivie writes, “The president’s profile of terrorism, it goes almost
without saying, was the single most influential interpretation of the danger at hand. It
was his role and the responsibility of his office to shape public opinion, to put events in
perspective, and to set the nation on a sensible course of action85. Douglas Kellner
argues that post-9/11, Bush manipulated a scared American public through a policy of
outright lying in order to achieve his goal of getting America to fight a war against
Iraq 86. In terms of the theory forwarded here, Bush set the agenda by emphasizing a
worldwide war on terrorists and sold policies that included the USA Patriot Act87 and
the war with Iraq.
Jack Goldsmith’s account of serving as head of the Office of Legal Counsel for
the Bush Administration highlights many of the malfeasances that the Bush
Administration indulged in during its War on Terror. Goldsmith notes that the
“underlying commitment” of the Bush Administration was “expanding presidential
power” 88. Goldsmith reports that the CIA was risk averse prior to 9/11 due to its worry
about legal liability 89. While the pressure to do more increased exponentially after
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9/11, Goldsmith notes that “the institutional factors contributing to risk aversion
remained in place, and stood as an obstacle to the White House’s aggressive go-it-alone
strategy.” The Office of Legal Counsel proved critical in this respect as they could
“provide the legal cover needed to overcome law-induced bureaucratic risk-aversion” 90.
Bush spent considerable time and energy “selling” the Iraq War. His emphasis
on “evil” and the need to “pull together” proved effective even in the face of a lack of
hard evidence for Iraqi weapons of mass destruction 91. Bush purposely “amplified “the
threat from Saddam Hussein in order to sell war with Iraq. He repeatedly emphasized
that “state sponsors of terror would enhance the sophistication of weaponry used by
terrorists,” and argued that the “gathering nexus of terrorist groups, state sponsors of
terrorists, and weapons of mass destruction” warranted a preemptive conflict even if
the probability of such a nexus amounted to one percent 92. As DiMaggio avers, “U.S.
presidents historically portray instability within enemy countries as a justification for
intervention”93. Time and again human rights, security or democracy are touted as the
high-minded cause for American involvement 94. As President Bush stated to the United
Nations, justifying a war to presumably establish a democracy in Iraq, “Every nation
must have avenues for the peaceful expression of opinion and dissent. When these
avenues are closed, the temptation to speak through violence grows” 95.
Kelley emphasizes that Bush “deliberately manipulated intelligence to justify a
war he and his staff were determined to wage for ‘other reasons’ such as manipulating
the strategic balance in the Middle East in favor of American interests” 96. In an
examination of Colin Powell’s now infamous February 5, 2003 United Nations speech
arguing for war with Iraq, David Zarefsky emphasizes that the intelligence upon which
Powell based his claims was faulty 97. Citing the “Downing Street report,” Zarefsky
states that the “Bush Administration made an early decision to remove Saddam
Hussein and then shaped its (and the public’s) understanding of events with that goal
in mind” 98.
From the outset, George W. Bush sought to link terrorists to a worldwide
conspiracy and emphasized repeatedly that the war on terror would be a long one.
Chart 2.2 shows the frequency and percentage of George W. Bush speeches containing
the theme that terrorists were part of a worldwide conspiracy. Chart 2.3 depicts the
frequency and percentages of formal terrorism speeches where Bush mentioned the
theme that the war on terror would be long. As other charts will reinforce, George W.
Bush needed to re-sell his terrorism policies, particularly the Iraq War, in 2005 and 2006
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which accounts for the jump in the percentage of terrorism speeches containing the
theme of a long war during those years.
[ Insert Chart 2.2 Here]
[ Insert Chart 2.3 Here]
In Wesley Windmaier’s account, Bush’s response to the 9/11 attacks was
“marked by fast-thinking moral absolutism which justified a preemptive war in Iraq to
prevent the use of weapons of mass destruction.” When those weapons were not found,
Bush pivoted to a “freedom agenda,” which he touted during his second inaugural
address, based on a quest for global democratization 99. In that address Bush stated that
“every man and woman on this earth has rights, and dignity, and matchless value…So
it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic
movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of
ending tyranny in our world” 100. It is important to note here that Bush’s second term
saw the Iraq War enter a phase of increasingly bloody sectarian violence, including the
infamous destruction of the al-Askari mosque in Samarra in 2006, and a concomitant
pressure to seek out diplomatic avenues for recourse 101.
Bush’s ramp up to the Iraq War successfully connected al Qaeda’s plans with
those of Saddam Hussein’s. Bush did this by portraying Iraq as a “grave threat” to
peace that would get “worse with time” 102 and by connecting Saddam Hussein’s
alleged continued quest to attain weapons of mass destruction with al Qaeda’s goal to
do the same103. The purported plot would be for Iraq and al Qaeda to work together to
strike at the United States—presumably with some kind of nuclear or radiological
terrorism. Bush and his surrogates repeatedly linked al Qaeda, Iraq and the September
11th attacks104. For instance, the President declared that, “The gravest danger facing
America and the world is outlaw regimes that seek and possess nuclear, chemical, and
biological weapons. These regimes could…give or sell those weapons to terrorist allies,
who would use them without the least hesitation” 105.
The following chart (Chart 2.4) is telling. Here, like in Chart 2.1, we again see
what terms George W. Bush used to refer to terrorists in his post-9/11 speeches on
terrorism. This time, the descriptors are more concrete as here he refers to America’s
adversaries as Taliban, some sort of outlaw or terror regime 106, al Qaeda and Iraqis or
Saddamists. Note that Iraq and outlaw/terror regimes (not including the Taliban)
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become a rather large concern in 2002 before fading away. This is consistent with the
policy selling dynamic depicted in Chart 2.1 107.
[Insert Chart 2.4 Here]
Anthony DiMaggio declares the Iraq War mobilization campaign “one of the
most flagrant misinformation campaigns in U.S. history” as evidenced by the findings
of the Iraq Study Group 108. The administration’s arguments were fraudulent, based
upon flimsy evidence (such as the testimony of a single defector) and intelligence
agencies were pressured to produce facts to conform to the administration’s vision 109.
As Hans Blix wrote in his book Disarming Iraq, “it took much twisted evidence,
including a forged uranium contract, to conjure up a revived Iraqi nuclear threat” 110.
Incredibly, when reporter Martha Raddatz confronted George W. Bush about the
nonexistent connection between Iraq and al Qaeda in December 2008, the President
retorted, “Yeah, that’s right. So what?” 111.
The news media mostly bought Bush’s portrayal of Iraq as an imminent threat.
Further, research by Brigitte Nacos, et al. shows that increased reporting on terrorist
threats was linked to greater public support for the Bush Administration 112. The
immediate aftermath of 9/11, where the public was decidedly behind the President,
“emphasized the power of the president to construct fear, as transmitted through a
compliant media system, and to amplify preexisting fear in the American mind” 113.
Yet the President’s popularity—tied to the Iraq War—would soon fade. From
2003 to 2008, support for the Iraq War waned as Americans grew weary of war and saw
the project as an inauspicious proposition 114. Antiwar sentiment grew in the mid-aughts
as Iraq descended into an increasingly bloody civil conflict. Meanwhile, the Bush
Administration attempted to fan the flames of public war approval by repeatedly
engaging in rhetoric that emphasized fear and the values of democracy115.
Concomitantly, Bush’s credibility took a hit as Iraq’s purported weapons of mass
destruction were never found 116. April 2004 saw more scandal and a greater loss of
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credibility as news of the abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison broke 117. Bush’s
credibility gap continued to grow as he deflected criticism for Abu Ghraib, instead
blaming individual service members for human rights abuses that went on at the prison
while still defending “enhanced interrogation techniques” for combatting terrorism. In
a speech on May 24, 2004, he emphasized the growth in liberty and potentials for
prosperity in Iraq rather than focusing on what had become an international scandal 118.
As the post-9/11 fog of war lifted, Bush’s preemptive war footing strained his
credibility as America had initiated a conflict against a state that had done little to
warrant it 119. Support for the Iraq War eroded rather quickly, fifteen months after the
war began, a majority of Americans viewed the conflict as a “mistake” according to
Gallup 120. Bush’s credibility gap led to plummeting public support 121. Meanwhile the
thorny issue of the “legal limbo” in which the Guantanamo detainees continued to
inhabit and the inglorious moment where the 2,000th American soldier was killed in
Iraq (reported on October 25, 2005) certainly did not help the matter122.
In response, Bush pressed harder into making speeches about the evils of
terrorism emphasizing, for instance, the ruthlessness of the enemy and the pitfalls of
creating a vacuum in Iraq (which, of course, would be borne out under Obama’s
presidency) 123. Critically, while Bush rarely referred to violent jihad against America, he
started doing so in this period where the war was flagging. Further, he also consistently
reiterated the importance of the terror threat during this period. Note the emphasis on
violent jihad and the necessity of the war terror in the time period between 2005 and
2006 depicted in both the frequency and percentage numbers in Table 2.2.
[Insert Table 2.2 Here]
By February 22, 2006, when the al Askari mosque was bombed in Samarra
escalating the civil conflict in Iraq into an even more brutal phase, Bush’s rhetoric
linking the Iraq conflict to freedom for the people of the Middle East had become so out
of touch that it bordered on the absurd 124. In January 2007, Bush would announce a
surge of 20,000 American troops added to the extant forces already in Iraq. He also
acknowledged that the 2005 Iraqi election had not had the desired effect as violence in
Baghdad worsened and the destruction of the dome of the aforementioned mosque in
Samarra (one of Shia Islam’s holiest sites) exacerbated the situation 125. The surge,
unpopular among a growing element of the American public opposed to the Iraq War,
stabilized Iraq partly due to the ethnic cleansing that had already gone on in
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Baghdad 126, partly due to the presence of US troops and partly due to the assistance of
the Sunni Muslim community 127.
Chart 2.5 depicts the number of speeches George W. Bush made wherein he
linked terrorism to other conflicts or issues. While Bush did link the fight with terrorists
to World War II and the Nazi threat and to the Cold War a number of times, Iraq was
by far the most common linkage (even including Afghanistan). He also linked the terror
threat between 2001 and 2004 to the broader problems and conflicts in the Middle East
before dropping that linkage completely. Bush pushed the Iraq and broader Middle
East connection hard in the run up to the Iraq War and then did so again as the war
faltered, mentioning the link to Iraq in 40 speeches in 2006, in 25 speeches in 2007 and in
25 speeches from 2008 until the end of his term. This second cluster of connections to
Iraq proves that he had to re-sell the war to a weary public and to rhetorically push the
deeply unpopular surge plan.
[ Insert Chart 2.5 Here]
As support for war dropped, Bush employed the narrative of a resilient enemy.
Chart 2.6 tracks the theme of the terrorist enemy’s resilience in Bush’s formal rhetoric.
Note the huge jump in percentage and frequency of speeches wherein George W. Bush
emphasizes the resilience of America’s terrorist foes from 2004 to 2005. Here again we
see proof of how policy selling works. Bush needed to make speeches about a topic and
set the agenda when he was selling a policy, but once that policy was passed he did not
need to continuously harp on it. With the Iraq War, he needed to reiterate the
importance of a conflict that was going decidedly poorly and eventually sell a troop
surge to the American public.
[ Insert Chart 2.6 Here]
Mary Stuckey and Josh Ritter show that Bush’s clever use of the term human
rights served to dissociate his administration from its own excesses. In response to
accusations of torture, Bush stated that, “this is not America” distancing himself from a
torture program he enacted128. Strangely, Bush claimed that tyrants were ones who
committed torture and other human rights abuses while his administration was doing
the same. One way he sidestepped this conundrum was by pointing to the “system of
law” in America; a system that he manipulated in formulating his “enhanced
interrogation” program 129.
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This convoluted rhetoric, meant to provide cover for policies borne of the war on
terror, exemplified Bush’s approach. He unequivocally placed certain actions—human
rights abuses, for instance—in the realm of “evil” but, in pursuing the so-called evildoers, had to conduct evil actions of his own including torture and the killing of
hundreds of thousands of people in war. Human rights or at least humanitarian
intervention became a cover for a wide range of abuses 130. As Ivie critiques: “What
would Americans see if they could reflect the crude image they have made of their
enemy directly back upon themselves? They would see a rogue nation of power-hungry
religious fanatics attempting to remake the Middle East in their own image by
perpetrating immoral acts of violence on a massive scale with criminal disregard for the
rules of civilized warfare” 131. In other words, America projected an image of itself onto
terrorists; alternatively, one might argue the thirst for revenge among Americans led
the country to embody the very terrorists they hated132.
Conclusions
George W. Bush pushed a rhetoric of fear onto the American public as
exemplified in the evidence presented in this chapter. Here we saw that presidents push
rhetoric on specific subjects when they need to sell policies and set the political agenda.
The 9/11 attacks set the agenda on terrorism for everyone in America—and, as the
following chapters will show, that agenda has been hard to shake. George W. Bush
made a slew of speeches in the wake of the attacks in which he pressed a broad agenda
due to a purported worldwide conspiracy of terrorists. This expansive agenda, Bush
argued, necessitated a multi-front war. Part of this war would mean securing the
homeland, which meant the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and the
passage of the USA Patriot Act. Next, President Bush used this wide anti-terrorism
agenda to connect international terrorists to Iraq and Saddam Hussein. Bush and his
administration looked to sell a war in Iraq in 2001 and 2002 after which he became more
quiescent and concrete regarding terrorism. In 2005, when Bush’s credibility gap grew
to the point that he had to stop pretending that all was sunny in Iraq, he began to re-sell
the conflict. This time, he emphasized the necessity of the war on terrorism in addition
to re-emphasizing the threat of weapons of mass destruction getting into the hands of
terrorists, the violent jihad that terrorists sowed, and the resilience of America’s
opponents.
President George W. Bush was repeatedly successful in achieving the policy
goals he sought. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq both met little resistance in Congress
despite a large protest movement against the latter war. The USA Patriot Act was
passed and repassed, giving the President new tools for combatting terrorism.
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Additionally, Bush was able to reorganize the federal government, creating the new
Department of Homeland Security to focus more resources on the threat of terrorism.
The surge of troops in Iraq, an unpopular suggestion at the time, was also enacted. Bush
also successfully framed terrorists as “enemy combatants,” outside the realms of
regular warfare and international law, who needed to be detained at the detention
center at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. In sum, Bush’s rhetoric achieved quite a lot. His
popularity after 9/11 surely was a help and he used this “social capital” to push a war
in Iraq that many saw as unnecessary.
President George W. Bush was able to frame the issue of terrorism as a war
against a resilient, worldwide enemy. Some may see this supposition as common sense
but it is far from it. He could have focused his actions on al Qaeda and the Taliban in
Afghanistan. But, instead, he sought to expand the conflict and to remake the Middle
East. President Bush did exact some foresight. International terrorism had hit American
embassies in Africa and an American naval ship in Yemen in previous years. Focusing
solely on Afghanistan, as his critics desired, might have proven too narrow a goal.
Overly playing down the terrorist enemy might have also proven foolish.
Either way, President Barack Obama sought to put some of the policy ideas of
Bush’s critics into practice when he took power. Obama sought to play down the terror
threat and work on repairing relationships with Muslim countries. Still, despite his
desire to do the contrary, he maintained and sometimes bolstered many of the very
Bush policies that Obama claimed to abhor. In the next chapter, we turn to Barack
Obama’s recalibration of the terrorist threat.

